Books I and II: THE HOUSEHOLDRead I.1. "Some people think": cf. Plato, Statesman [258e- 259d]. "The distinction between king and statesman" or politician: A kingly or royal regime is rule over free subjects by one who is their superior in virtue, who rules continually, without being subject to law; a "political" or "constitutional" regime or "polity" is one in which the citizens are equals and take turns to rule under law. This is explained in Politics [I.7]. "The compound should always be resolved into the simple elements" (a principle borrowed from Plato): The elements of the state are villages, households, individuals. Book I of the Politics is mostly about the household. Aristotle begins chapter 2 by saying that if we want to obtain the clearest view of things we must consider them "in their first growth and origin" (compare Plato, Republic, 369ab, Readings, p. 59). In the next few paragraphs, which are omitted in the Readings, Aristotle discusses the elements from which the city originates. First comes the family, then several families unite to form a village; when several villages unite into a community large enough to be self-sufficient they form a state (city, polis) -- "originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life" (1252 b28). A political animalAt this point another, and distinctively Aristotelian, principle comes into play: that the nature of something is best seen (not by analysis into elements, or by looking to its origins, but) by studying the mature and fully-developed specimen. To understand a thing's nature you do not look to its origin but to its full development. In nature the fully-developed instance is the goal or end toward which development takes place, so if you look to the end you can understand the earlier stages of development. If the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature... Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal [1252 b30-1253 a3] A "political animal" means an animal whose nature is to live in a polis or city, not isolated or in small groups. "Civilization" (from Latin civitas, a city) is the natural state for the human animal. It is the natural state not in the sense that it is the original state, but in the sense that the natural goal of human development is life in cities. This is a rejection of the idea common at the time, and since, that civilization is artificial, conventional, unnatural. Aristotle would have agreed with the 18th century writer who said (I can't remember who it was!) that "it is natural to man to be artificial". (On the contrast between convention (law, nomos) and nature (physis) see Thucydides V.105, Readings, p. 40, and compare I.76, Readings, p. 11). In Aristotle's philosophy, "nature" (in Greek physis, from which we get "physics") -- nature is the principle of growth or development: a thing's nature is what makes it develop in a certain way, and development is for the sake of its goal. Aristotle's physics is said to be teleological, from the Greek word "telos", a goal or end: according to Aristotle every nature exists for some purpose. (However, he did not think that nature was designed by a mind; Aristotle did believe, for philosophical reasons, in a supreme being or god, but he believed that the world had existed eternally, that it was not created by God, that God was not the designer of things. Natural purposes are, so to speak, blind and unconscious, except in human beings.) 

"It is clear, then" (1255 a2): It is not! This chapter illustrates the suggestion that many parts of Aristotle's works were put together with sticky-tape by some editor, possibly not Aristotle himself. At beginning of the chapter and the end the editor has supplied a definite statement, which is not borne out by the argument between. Joints between fragments seem visible (put dividing marks into the text at these points) at 1254 a24 ("And there are"); 25 ("(and that)"); 29 ("for in all" -- what follows does not support the statement that there are many kinds of rulers); 36 ("But then); 1254 b3 ("At all events"); 4 ("And it is clear"); 12 ("Again"); etc. Between these segments there is no real connection. Re-read the passage and consider its coherence. READ I.6 Some comments: "Power seems to imply virtue" (1255 a16): Aristotle does not himself hold that superior power implies moral superiority. This chapter is exploratory. "A common interest" (1255b 14): Namely, the master's. Apart from the introductory and concluding remarks of chapter 5 (1254 a20, 1255 b1), these two chapters could be taken as dialectical, i.e. as a quasi-dialogue between two points of view without any resolution of the question. However, in many places in the Politics it is clear that Aristotle did hold that there are natural slaves. "The slave has no deliberative faculty at all" (I.13, [1260 a12]). "Slaves and brute animals... cannot [form a state], for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice"; III.9, 1280 a32-4 (Readings, top of p. 105). He does not again refer to the possibility that the enslavement of war captives (the main source of slaves in ancient Greece) might be unjust. It seems that Aristotle did accept this institution of Greek life, though some of his contemporaries were questioning it. WomenIn various places in book I Aristotle refers to women. In 1252 b1 (not included in Readings) he says that "nature has distinguished between the female and the slave" -- so women are not slaves. However, they are normally subordinate to men. At 1254 b13 (Readings, p. 102) he says: "Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled". Women are ruled, not as slaves are, for the master's benefit, but for their own good, just as the rulers of a city must seek the good of the citizens, not the good of the rulers (this is a point we will come to later, but it will already be familiar from Plato). And the rule of husband over wife is like "constitutional" government. In chapter 12, [1259 a40-] he says: A husband and father... rules over wife and children, both free [i.e. neither is a slave], but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature [i.e. occasionally a wife may be wiser than her husband], the male is by nature fitter for command than the female... But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect... The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. 

This passage seems to say that the relation of husband to wife is like the relationship of ruler to ruled in a constitutional government, in which citizens take turns to rule because "the natures of the citizens are equal and do not differ at all", though it is customary to pay the rulers special respect; but in marriage there is a permanent inequality. He seems to want to say that men and women are by nature equal, like citizens in a constitutional regime, but permanently unequal. This seems contradictory. In the next chapter, [chapter 13 of book I] there is a discussion of the question whether slaves and freemen, women and men, have the same virtues. If we say that slaves can have the same virtues as freemen, then why are they slaves? On the other hand, since they are human beings and have reason, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. Similarly with women. We can generalise the problem, and ask in general about natural ruler and natural subject: "if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule and the other always be ruled?" Aristotle answers in terms of his theory of the parts of the soul. You will remember that Plato distinguished three parts of the human soul, the reason, the spirited part and the desires. Aristotle also makes a distinction within the reason. One part of the soul is reasonable in the sense that it deliberates, reasons, and draws conclusions -- he sometimes calls this the deliberative faculty; another part of the soul is reasonable in the sense that it is persuadable by reasoning. The emotions are persuadable. It is possible to reason someone into a different state of feeling; it is sometimes possible to reason yourself into a different state of feeling -- to reduce fear, for example, by reflecting on the real facts about the apparent dangers or by reflecting on the importance and value of what it is one has to do in the face of real dangers. Corresponding to the two reasonable parts of the soul there are two sets of virtues: there are intellectual virtues, virtues of the reasoning or deliberative faculty, and there are moral virtues, virtues of the persuadable part, the part of the soul that is capable of being influenced by reasoning. Courage, for example, is a moral virtue that consists in the responsiveness of one's fears to reasoning. (Aristotle relates the kinds of virtues to the parts of the soul in another work, the Nicomachean Ethics; see the extract in Readings, p.98, RH.) How does this distinction between parts of the soul and kinds of virtue resolve the questions whether slaves and women can have virtues and if so why should they always be subordinate, though in different ways, to free men? Aristotle's answer seems to be that slaves can have only the virtues belonging to the part of the soul that is influenced by reasoning, while women can also have the intellectual virtues, but in a subordinate way. "For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority" [1260 a12]. This of course prompts the question why is a woman's deliberative faculty without authority? Aristotle does not ask or answer this question. He concludes that all human beings including slaves have moral virtue, that free men and women have intellectual virtue also, but that in women the moral and intellectual virtues are marked by subordination: "Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them [i.e. to women, slaves and free men]; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying" [1260a 20-23]. (The reference to Socrates is to Socrates' theory that the virutes are just different names for one and the same thing, namely knowledge, knowledge of the relative goodness and evil of the things among which we have to choose, available at the moment of choice: if all the virtues are really this one thing, then there can't be different virtues for different people.) 

It is interesting that despite his acquaintance with Plato's thinking on this subject, Aristotle accepts the customary subordination of women to men without being able to justify it. Well, this completes our sampling of Book I. The main topic has been the family or household as the element from which states are formed, and the aspects we have looked at are slavery and the place of women -- topics Aristotle does not handle well (it's a pity these topics come early in the book, because readers may be discouraged from reading the rest of the book); another topic of Book I that we haven't looked at is the family's property. Book II is a discussion of the views of various other thinkers on the best state, including Plato's sketch of such a state in The Republic. We will read Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's views on private property and the family. Against the abolition of the familyPlato proposed that among the guardians there should be no separate families (Republic [416-7]). His argument for this is that then there will be more unity in the state; re-read Republic 462-4 (Readings, p. 68-9). Against this Aristotle says: For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect something which he expects another to fulfil; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike [1261 b34-1262 a2]. Private vs common propertyPlato also proposed that the Guardians should not have private property. Read Aristotle, book II, ch. 5 (Readings, p. 103) to 1264 a4. Notice these arguments carefully. In one form or other they have often been used in favour of the institution of private property. Notice what Aristotle says near the bottom LH of p. 103, 1263 a21ff; his preference is for a society in which individuals are in charge of particular things but freely allow others to use them. This is all we will read of Book II. Criticism of Plato's Republic occupies II.1-5, criticism of his book The Laws occupies II.6. Chapters 7 and 8 criticise other utopias. The rest of book II criticises Sparta, Crete and Carthage, often regarded (especially by conservatives) as models to which other states should conform. Aristotle's writings often include a survey of what other thinkers have said about the question he is writing about. After the survey of opinions about the best state you would expect him to present his own view of what kind of state is best, but in fact we don't come to that until book VII. Book III makes a new beginning. "He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of government must first of all determine 'What is a state?'" After a preliminary discussion of who counts as a citizen [III.1-5], he raises the question How many kinds of state are there? How many kinds of constitutions are there? Are some constitutions good or true forms and others bad? This is the part of Book III we will look at. 

Books III-IV: KINDS OF CONSTITUTIONSFirst, what does he mean by a constitution? Passages not in the Readings make it clear that a "constitution" need not be a body of law or something officially written down. A city's constitution is the organisation of its magistracies or offices. Every ordered state has a constitution, since every such state has some organisation of magistracies. [See 1278 b9, 1289 b15, 1290 a8-9]. In Aristotle's teleological philosophy organisation is always for the sake of some end or purpose. The true end or purpose of the state, he says, is to help its members live, and to live a good life. Re-read the opening paragraph of the Politics, Readings, p. 101. Constitutions which aim at the good life for the citizens are true constitutions, those which aim at the good of the rulers only are perversions [1279 a17-21]. There are echoes here of Plato; remember in The Republic Socrates' argument with Thrasymachus, in which Socrates argued that government is an art the purpose of which is to further the good of the governed. Read III.7, Readings, p. 104. "Aristocracy": rule by the best (aristos). In practice this usually meant rule by the well-born, those of noble family, who referred to themselves as "the best people". "The generic name -- a constitution": or "polity" (politeia, constitution). In modern English "polity" is not a common word, but when it is used it means form of government or type of constitution; thus one might speak of a democratic polity or a monarchical polity. Aristotle uses "polity" both in that way, as the generic name for a constitution of any sort, and as the name of one of the sorts. One of the kinds of polity is "polity", i.e. the polity or form of government in which all citizens rule and are ruled in turn. The idea of polity is that all citizens should take short turns at ruling. It is an inclusive form of government: everyone has a share of political power. He sometimes calls it "polity", sometimes "political" or "constitutional" government -- these are interchangeable. "Oligarchy", the generic name for rule by a few, is also the name of one kind of rule by the few, the perverted kind which seeks to further the interest of the wealthy few. "Democracy" means literally rule by the people, but Aristotle and other ancient writers use it to mean rule exclusively by the poor in their own interest. It would be a good idea to put down on paper the classification this passage suggests: Classification of Constitutions Good Bad One Kingship Tyranny Few Aristocracy Oligarchy Many Polity Democracy For the rows "rule of one", etc., compare Herodotus III.80-83 (see Readings, p. 1). The "good" and "bad" columns come from Plato. This is the classification put forward by Plato. Plato used "democracy" for both kinds of rule by the many, because he saw little difference between good and bad rule by many -- at its best, democracy is too weak to do much good and at its worst too weak to do much harm, according to Plato. Turn back and re-read Plato, Statesman, 302c-303b (Readings, pp. 90-91. 

Read III.11 This is an answer to some of Plato's arguments against democracy. "Among them they understand the whole" (1281 b9): taken literally this is nonsense. They need to discuss, and communicate to all, or most, what each has understood; and for this they may not have the necessary time, goodwill or ability. "To assign them some deliberative and judicial functions... but... not allow them to hold office singly" (1281 b30): This is in effect a combination of oligarchy and democracy. As we will see later, Aristotle himself thinks that the best practicable state, the one in which virtue has the best chance of influence, is one in which some political functions are assigned to the many poor and other functions to the few rich, so as to produce a balance of the classes (compare J.S. Mill)."All professions and arts" (1282 a1): Plato holds that government is, or can be, an art, and infers that only a few should rule because only a few can master any art (cf. Statesman, 292e-3a, Readings, pp. 84-5, and 297bc, Readings, p. 87). Aristotle suggests that "the intelligent man who has studied the art", but not enough to be a practitioner, may be a good judge. Also, the "consumer" may be better than the producer at judging the quality of the product (1282 a17-). Discussion of the question "Who should rule?" continues to the end of chapter 13. The discussion is exploratory, not definitive. KingshipBook III, chapter 14, begins a discussion of the first of the forms of government listed in chapter 7, kingship. In chapter 14 he distinguishes five different kinds of kingship. One of these is kingship not subject to law. Plato argued that the ideally best form of government is one in which the philosopher is a king unfettered by any law: Statesman, 294, 295 (Readings, pp. 85-6). Read III.15 (Readings, p. 106 RH). The argument of 1286 a38 ("Or..." ) is that for a given standard of virtue, many rulers are better than one. Read III.16 This is also against Plato. Aristotle advocates what is called "the rule of law" or "the rule of laws, not men". See also his Rhetoric, I.1, 1354 a30-b15 (Readings, p. 117, near the bottom LH). Aristotle does not deny Plato's point that laws framed in general terms cannot provide for unusual cases. It must be possible for magistrates to make exceptions: When the law speaks universally, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right... to say what the legislator himself would have... put into his law if he had known... And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality"; Nichomachean Ethics, V.10. The outcome of Aristotle's discussion of kingship is that normally it is not a good constitution. Where men are alike and equal, the rule of a king is inappropriate [III.17, 1288 a1-5]. If there is someone whose virtue exceeds that of all the others put together, he should be king [1288 a15-19, 35-8]; cf. [1284 a3-7], but obviously, this is not likely to happen often. 

Book V: REVOLUTIONSBook V is about revolution. Revolutions often arise out of equality and inequality and ideas of justice. Democracy is based on the idea that those who are equally free should be absolutely equal, oligarchy on the idea that those unequal in property should be unequal politically [1301 a28-35; cf. 1280 a9-25, 1283 a25-8]. (Aristotle himself thinks that justice requires that equals be treated equally, unequals unequally, the treatment being proportioned to some relevant respect in which people are equal or unequal; (see Nicomachean Ethics, [V.3] and Politics [III.12]; cf. Plato, Laws, [757]). The chief cause of the feelings that lead to revolution is a desire for equality, when men think they are equal to others who have more, or for inequality, when they think they are superior [1302 a23-7]. There are other causes of revolution -- insolence of magistrates, honour and dishonour, fear, disproportionate increase in some part of a state, election intrigues, difference of race, etc. Aristotle gives various instances, drawn presumably from his school's researches into constitutional history [V.3, 4]. (Members of the Lyceum wrote studies of the constitutional history of 158 regimes. Only fragments have survived. The Constitution of Athens, attributed to Aristotle himself, was lost for centuries but was rediscovered in 1891. These 158 constitutional histories may have provided the historical illustrations found in many parts of the Politics, especially in the extracts following.) Read the extracts from book V (chapters 5, 6, 8, 9, 11). In [1316 a1-] Aristotle criticises Plato's account of revolutions (Republic, [544-]).

Books VII and VIII: THE IDEAL CITYBook VII is the counterpart in Aristotle's work to Plato's Republic, a description of what it would be best to do if we had to found a new state. In inquiry about the best form of state it is necessary to decide first which is the most eligible (choice-worthy, preferable) life for individuals. Aristotle summarises parts of his "discussions outside the school" (dialogues, presumably, now lost) "concerning the best life". A happy man must have external goods, goods of the body (e.g. health), and goods of the soul (virtue). "Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation and the like" [1323 a35-40] -- i.e. of external goods. But experience shows that "happiness... is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities" [1323 b1-5]. "Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action" [1323 b22-3]. "The best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions" [1323 b40-]. (Compare N.E., book I, chs. 5, 7 and 8 (some extracts in Readings, pp 97-8); cf. Politics [VII.13]). "Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily" [1324 a23-5]. It is irrational to design a city for military power, to rule tyrannically over its neighbours [1324 b1-; cf. 1333 a35-1334 a10]. (Compare Plato, Laws, 625-.) "Warlike pursuits... are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them" [1325 a5-10]. The happy life is one of virtuous activity. "Activity" is not to be construed too narrowly: thinking is activity. "Not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves", i.e. philosophy and science -- see E.N., book X, chs. 7 and 8. "Virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act" [1325 b17-23]. The good state will therefore be one which makes it possible for its citizens to engage in intelligent and virtuous activity, including scientific and philosophical thinking. For some of this activity leisure is needed; see VII.15. Aristotle probably assumes that citizens will be active in the dramatic performances, gymnasia, games and religious functions customary in Athens. Compare Plato, Laws, 803-4.) Details of the ideal cityAristotle then goes on (chs. 4-8) to discuss the appropriate population, site, etc. for the ideal city. He comes then to the allocation of functions to various sections of the population. "The citizens must not live the life of mechanics [artisans] or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue" [1328 b40]. Since "those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution" [1329 a12] the deliberative assembly should consist of the warriors, or older men of the warrior class. This "is just, and is founded upon a principle of conformity to merit. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state... The husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarian Perioeci" [1329 a16-26; cf. 1330 a25-35.] (Perioeci are resident non-citizens.) "It is expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of their services" [1330 a34]. Thus citizens live the life of virtuous activity, and farmers and artisans, who cannot live such a life, are excluded from citizenship. Chapters 13-15 look like another version of the first chapters of the book. They are followed by a discussion of marriage, upbringing of children and education, which continues to the end of book VIII, the end of The Politics.

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