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6月补充ECO译文第一篇（平时记得跟着做，免得到我定期汇总的时候哭）标题Murder most foul，有同名的书和64年老电影，感兴趣的亲可以去看看~
Free exchange
Murder most foul
When periods of economic growth come to an end, old age is rarely to blame
自由交流
辣手摧发
当经济增长期走到尽头，很少是因为年头过长
IN JUNE America’s economic expansion will be seven years old. That is practically geriatric: only three previous ones lasted longer. The record boom of the 1990s survived only ten years.
六月，美国经济扩张将迎来第七个年头，这可算得上高寿了：此前只有三次经济扩张的延续时间长过这次。上世纪九十年代那次持续时间最长的繁荣期也只有十年。
It is tempting to look at that ten-year mark as something like the maximum lifespan of an expansion in America, and to worry, correspondingly, that the current expansion’s days are running short. But are they? At a press conference in December Janet Yellen, chairman of America’s Federal Reserve, declared: “I think it’s a myth that expansions die of old age.” Yet die they do. Either Ms Yellen is wrong, or someone is bumping off otherwise healthy expansions before their time.
人们不禁会将这十年的纪录看做是美国一轮经济扩张的最长寿命，也就相应地会担心当前的这轮扩张时日无多了。果真如此吗？在去年12月举行的一次新闻发布会上，美联储主席珍妮特•耶伦（Janet Yellen）宣称：“我认为经济扩张的时间长了就该结束的说法是一种误区。”然而扩张终有结束之时。要么是耶伦错了，要么是有人提前扼杀了健康的经济扩张。
Like death, recessions (commonly defined as two consecutive quarters of falling GDP) are a part of life. Supply shocks occasionally prompt them: soaring oil prices in 1973 hit consumers in rich economies like an enormous tax rise, for instance, diminishing their purchasing power and thus prompting GDP to fall. More often, weak demand is to blame. Financial-market wobbles or rising interest rates cause people to cling tighter to their cash. Fear proves contagious, leading to a spiral of self-fulfilling pessimism.
正如死亡一样，经济衰退（一般定义为连续两个季度GDP下降）也是生命的一部分。供给冲击偶尔会促发衰退：例如，1973年的油价飙升好比大幅增税一样打击了富裕国家的消费者，削弱了他们的购买力，由此造成GDP下降。而更多时候，衰退的出现要归咎于需求疲软。金融市场波动或利率上涨使人们把钱包抓得更紧。事实证明恐慌是会传染的，并最终让人们在悲观情绪中越陷越深。
But not all expansions are as short-lived as America’s (see chart). The Netherlands holds the record: its longest, which ended in 2008, lasted nearly 26 years. Australia may surpass that early next year: its continuing expansion dates back to 1991. If expansions have a natural lifespan, it is longer than a decade.
但并非所有的经济扩张都如美国的一样短命（见图表）。扩张期的纪录由荷兰保持：其最长一次经济扩张止于2008年，延续了近26年。澳大利亚明年年初有可能会超越这一纪录：其当前一轮扩张始于1991年。如果经济扩张有自然寿命，那么也不止十年。
Earlier this year Glenn Rudebusch of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco constructed an actuarial table for America’s historical expansions, much as a life-insurance company would for people. In rich countries the probability of a person’s death rises gradually from middle age until the mid-80s, then quite steeply thereafter. Expansions, however, do not seem to become more vulnerable with age. There have been only 12 American expansions since the end of the second world war; the universe of people who have lived and died is somewhat larger. But the data available suggest that there was a time when cycles aged like people. Before the second world war, Mr Rudebusch notes, the odds of tipping into recession rose as an expansion got older. Yet since the 1940s age has not withered them: an expansion in its 40th month is just as vulnerable, statistically, as one in its 80th (each has about a 75% chance of surviving the next year).
今年早些时候，旧金山联邦储备银行的格伦•鲁迪布什（Glenn Rudebusch）为美国历次经济扩张制作了一张精算生命表，很像人寿保险公司为人做的生命表。在富裕国家，一个人的死亡概率从中年开始逐渐上升，到80多岁后则陡然上升。然而经济扩张看起来并不会随年头递增而变得脆弱。二战结束后美国只经历过12轮经济扩张，而人口生死的样本总归要多一些。但现有数据表明经济周期的衰亡曾一度和人的衰老过程一样。鲁迪布什注意到，在二战之前，经济陷入衰退的可能性会随着经济扩张年头的增加而上升。然而上世纪四十年代以来，年头长短似乎并没有什么影响：从统计数字来看，处于第40个月的扩张和处于第80个月的扩张同样脆弱（能撑过来年的概率都是75%）。
The notion of ageless recoveries is counter-intuitive. Finite business cycles seem to make sense: an economy just coming out of recession should have plenty of opportunities for investment, for example, which, once exhausted, make the onset of a new downturn more likely. Yet economists reckon cycles need not unfold like that; instead, it is possible for the composition of growth to change even as expansion continues. A booming tech sector might siphon off capital that would otherwise flow to infrastructure or housing. Those industries, in turn, could power growth once the tech boom runs its course. If all domestic investment opportunities are used up, capital should flow towards foreign investments, reducing the value of the currency and so helping exporters to spur the economy forward. As long as the end of a boom in one sector does not engender self-fulfilling pessimism in the rest of economy, the show should go on.
无休止的经济复苏似乎有违直觉。有限的经济周期看起来比较有道理：比如刚刚摆脱衰退的经济应该有很多投资机会，一旦用尽，就更有可能引发一轮新的衰退。然而经济学家认为经济周期未必一定如此展开；相反，即使经济扩张仍在继续，增长的构成也有可能发生改变。蓬勃发展的科技行业有可能吸走本会流向基建或房地产的资金，而后面这些行业反之在科技发展式微后可以继续推动增长。如果所有国内的投资机会都已用尽，资金应该流向海外投资，降低本币的价值，从而帮助出口商刺激经济继续向前。只要某个行业繁荣的终结不会让其他经济领域陷入越来越深的悲观情绪，那么经济应该还会继续发展下去。
The notion of ageless recoveries is counter-intuitive. Finite business cycles seem to make sense: an economy just coming out of recession should have plenty of opportunities for investment, for example, which, once exhausted, make the onset of a new downturn more likely. Yet economists reckon cycles need not unfold like that; instead, it is possible for the composition of growth to change even as expansion continues. A booming tech sector might siphon off capital that would otherwise flow to infrastructure or housing. Those industries, in turn, could power growth once the tech boom runs its course. If all domestic investment opportunities are used up, capital should flow towards foreign investments, reducing the value of the currency and so helping exporters to spur the economy forward. As long as the end of a boom in one sector does not engender self-fulfilling pessimism in the rest of economy, the show should go on.
既然如此，为什么经济还会陷入衰退呢？在战前时代，经济已经扩张的时间长短影响更大，而各国政府和央行在稳定经济方面发挥的作用则要小得多。经济冲击（从地震到金融危机）经常发生；经济扩张持续时间越长，出现严重灾难的可能性就越大，从而将经济推向衰退。
Yet after the Depression, governments took on the job of countering pessimism. Bigger welfare states provided bigger “automatic stabilisers”, meaning spending on things like unemployment benefits, which pump more money into an economy as growth weakens. Central banks began manipulating interest rates more vigorously to keep growth on track, and eventually adopted targets to help instil the expectation of steady growth.
然而在大萧条之后，政府开始着手抗击悲观情绪。越大的福利国家，提供的“自动稳定机制”也越多，即政府在失业补贴等项目上投入更多，而这在增长乏力时可为本国经济注入更多资金。央行开始更积极地调控利率来维持经济增长，并最终制定一系列目标来给市场灌输稳定增长的预期。
Ms Yellen, in the ballroom, with the premature rate rise
Post-war expansions are longer (and recessions shorter) than was once the case, but business-cycle immortality remains elusive. The end of some expansions is clearly the result of foul play. In the early 1980s, for instance, both America and Britain suffered recessions that were deliberately induced in order to bring down raging inflation.
耶伦宣布加息，但为时过早
战后经济扩张期要比以前更长（衰退期也更短），但永续的商业周期依然难以实现。有些扩张期的结束显然是人为造成的。比如上世纪八十年代初，美国和英国都遭遇了经济衰退，而这些都是蓄意诱发的，旨在降低严重的通货膨胀。
In other cases the culprit is human error. As central bankers freely admit, their control over the economy is imperfect. Policy works on a delay. Since not every shock can be anticipated, a bad blow may start a recession before a central bank can adequately respond. Or an inflation-averse central bank may discover, after it is too late to adjust course, that it raised interest rates once too often. What’s more, with interest rates in many economies near zero, central bankers find themselves increasingly reliant on unconventional tools, for which the margin of error is larger.
而另外几次衰退的元凶则是人为错误。央行行长们坦言他们对经济的调控并非完美。政策作用也会滞后。由于并非每一次经济冲击都可以预见，央行还来不及做出充分的反应，严重的冲击就可能引发衰退。或者，一个厌恶通胀的央行可能会发现先前加息太过频繁，想要扭转却为时已晚。此外，在很多国家利率已经趋近于零的情况下，央行行长们发现自己越来越依赖非常规工具，而这些工具出错的可能性会更大。
But there is a difference between misfortune and recklessness. Central banks that worry more about high inflation than low will tend to err on the hawkish side, and will find themselves steering into recession with some regularity. The Reserve Bank of Australia, which targets an inflation rate of between 2% and 3%, has given itself a floor to defend as well as a ceiling. That seems to help it from sinking into recession by mistake. The Fed, which has begun raising interest rates even as its preferred inflation measure remains below its target, has not absorbed this lesson—and Ms Yellen’s comments about the natural life of expansions should not be considered an alibi.
但不幸与蛮干还是有差别的。更担心高通胀率而非低通胀率的央行更有可能犯鹰派的错误，而且它们造成衰退的情况还有些规律可循。澳洲储备银行将通胀目标设定在2%到3%之间，在通胀的上下限两头作战，这似乎有助其避免误入衰退期。美联储并没有汲取这个经验，尽管其偏好的通胀指标低于目标，却已经着手加息。耶伦对经济扩张自然寿命的看法可不能拿来当借口啊。
2016年06月06日 05点06分
1
Free exchangeMurder most foul
When periods of economic growth come to an end, old age is rarely to blame
自由交流
辣手摧发
当经济增长期走到尽头，很少是因为年头过长
IN JUNE America’s economic expansion will be seven years old. That is practically geriatric: only three previous ones lasted longer. The record boom of the 1990s survived only ten years.
六月，美国经济扩张将迎来第七个年头，这可算得上高寿了：此前只有三次经济扩张的延续时间长过这次。上世纪九十年代那次持续时间最长的繁荣期也只有十年。
It is tempting to look at that ten-year mark as something like the maximum lifespan of an expansion in America, and to worry, correspondingly, that the current expansion’s days are running short. But are they? At a press conference in December Janet Yellen, chairman of America’s Federal Reserve, declared: “I think it’s a myth that expansions die of old age.” Yet die they do. Either Ms Yellen is wrong, or someone is bumping off otherwise healthy expansions before their time.
人们不禁会将这十年的纪录看做是美国一轮经济扩张的最长寿命，也就相应地会担心当前的这轮扩张时日无多了。果真如此吗？在去年12月举行的一次新闻发布会上，美联储主席珍妮特•耶伦（Janet Yellen）宣称：“我认为经济扩张的时间长了就该结束的说法是一种误区。”然而扩张终有结束之时。要么是耶伦错了，要么是有人提前扼杀了健康的经济扩张。
Like death, recessions (commonly defined as two consecutive quarters of falling GDP) are a part of life. Supply shocks occasionally prompt them: soaring oil prices in 1973 hit consumers in rich economies like an enormous tax rise, for instance, diminishing their purchasing power and thus prompting GDP to fall. More often, weak demand is to blame. Financial-market wobbles or rising interest rates cause people to cling tighter to their cash. Fear proves contagious, leading to a spiral of self-fulfilling pessimism.
正如死亡一样，经济衰退（一般定义为连续两个季度GDP下降）也是生命的一部分。供给冲击偶尔会促发衰退：例如，1973年的油价飙升好比大幅增税一样打击了富裕国家的消费者，削弱了他们的购买力，由此造成GDP下降。而更多时候，衰退的出现要归咎于需求疲软。金融市场波动或利率上涨使人们把钱包抓得更紧。事实证明恐慌是会传染的，并最终让人们在悲观情绪中越陷越深。
But not all expansions are as short-lived as America’s (see chart). The Netherlands holds the record: its longest, which ended in 2008, lasted nearly 26 years. Australia may surpass that early next year: its continuing expansion dates back to 1991. If expansions have a natural lifespan, it is longer than a decade.
但并非所有的经济扩张都如美国的一样短命（见图表）。扩张期的纪录由荷兰保持：其最长一次经济扩张止于2008年，延续了近26年。澳大利亚明年年初有可能会超越这一纪录：其当前一轮扩张始于1991年。如果经济扩张有自然寿命，那么也不止十年。
Earlier this year Glenn Rudebusch of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco constructed an actuarial table for America’s historical expansions, much as a life-insurance company would for people. In rich countries the probability of a person’s death rises gradually from middle age until the mid-80s, then quite steeply thereafter. Expansions, however, do not seem to become more vulnerable with age. There have been only 12 American expansions since the end of the second world war; the universe of people who have lived and died is somewhat larger. But the data available suggest that there was a time when cycles aged like people. Before the second world war, Mr Rudebusch notes, the odds of tipping into recession rose as an expansion got older. Yet since the 1940s age has not withered them: an expansion in its 40th month is just as vulnerable, statistically, as one in its 80th (each has about a 75% chance of surviving the next year).
今年早些时候，旧金山联邦储备银行的格伦•鲁迪布什（Glenn Rudebusch）为美国历次经济扩张制作了一张精算生命表，很像人寿保险公司为人做的生命表。在富裕国家，一个人的死亡概率从中年开始逐渐上升，到80多岁后则陡然上升。然而经济扩张看起来并不会随年头递增而变得脆弱。二战结束后美国只经历过12轮经济扩张，而人口生死的样本总归要多一些。但现有数据表明经济周期的衰亡曾一度和人的衰老过程一样。鲁迪布什注意到，在二战之前，经济陷入衰退的可能性会随着经济扩张年头的增加而上升。然而上世纪四十年代以来，年头长短似乎并没有什么影响：从统计数字来看，处于第40个月的扩张和处于第80个月的扩张同样脆弱（能撑过来年的概率都是75%）。
The notion of ageless recoveries is counter-intuitive. Finite business cycles seem to make sense: an economy just coming out of recession should have plenty of opportunities for investment, for example, which, once exhausted, make the onset of a new downturn more likely. Yet economists reckon cycles need not unfold like that; instead, it is possible for the composition of growth to change even as expansion continues. A booming tech sector might siphon off capital that would otherwise flow to infrastructure or housing. Those industries, in turn, could power growth once the tech boom runs its course. If all domestic investment opportunities are used up, capital should flow towards foreign investments, reducing the value of the currency and so helping exporters to spur the economy forward. As long as the end of a boom in one sector does not engender self-fulfilling pessimism in the rest of economy, the show should go on.
无休止的经济复苏似乎有违直觉。有限的经济周期看起来比较有道理：比如刚刚摆脱衰退的经济应该有很多投资机会，一旦用尽，就更有可能引发一轮新的衰退。然而经济学家认为经济周期未必一定如此展开；相反，即使经济扩张仍在继续，增长的构成也有可能发生改变。蓬勃发展的科技行业有可能吸走本会流向基建或房地产的资金，而后面这些行业反之在科技发展式微后可以继续推动增长。如果所有国内的投资机会都已用尽，资金应该流向海外投资，降低本币的价值，从而帮助出口商刺激经济继续向前。只要某个行业繁荣的终结不会让其他经济领域陷入越来越深的悲观情绪，那么经济应该还会继续发展下去。
The notion of ageless recoveries is counter-intuitive. Finite business cycles seem to make sense: an economy just coming out of recession should have plenty of opportunities for investment, for example, which, once exhausted, make the onset of a new downturn more likely. Yet economists reckon cycles need not unfold like that; instead, it is possible for the composition of growth to change even as expansion continues. A booming tech sector might siphon off capital that would otherwise flow to infrastructure or housing. Those industries, in turn, could power growth once the tech boom runs its course. If all domestic investment opportunities are used up, capital should flow towards foreign investments, reducing the value of the currency and so helping exporters to spur the economy forward. As long as the end of a boom in one sector does not engender self-fulfilling pessimism in the rest of economy, the show should go on.
既然如此，为什么经济还会陷入衰退呢？在战前时代，经济已经扩张的时间长短影响更大，而各国政府和央行在稳定经济方面发挥的作用则要小得多。经济冲击（从地震到金融危机）经常发生；经济扩张持续时间越长，出现严重灾难的可能性就越大，从而将经济推向衰退。
Yet after the Depression, governments took on the job of countering pessimism. Bigger welfare states provided bigger “automatic stabilisers”, meaning spending on things like unemployment benefits, which pump more money into an economy as growth weakens. Central banks began manipulating interest rates more vigorously to keep growth on track, and eventually adopted targets to help instil the expectation of steady growth.
然而在大萧条之后，政府开始着手抗击悲观情绪。越大的福利国家，提供的“自动稳定机制”也越多，即政府在失业补贴等项目上投入更多，而这在增长乏力时可为本国经济注入更多资金。央行开始更积极地调控利率来维持经济增长，并最终制定一系列目标来给市场灌输稳定增长的预期。
Ms Yellen, in the ballroom, with the premature rate rise
Post-war expansions are longer (and recessions shorter) than was once the case, but business-cycle immortality remains elusive. The end of some expansions is clearly the result of foul play. In the early 1980s, for instance, both America and Britain suffered recessions that were deliberately induced in order to bring down raging inflation.
耶伦宣布加息，但为时过早
战后经济扩张期要比以前更长（衰退期也更短），但永续的商业周期依然难以实现。有些扩张期的结束显然是人为造成的。比如上世纪八十年代初，美国和英国都遭遇了经济衰退，而这些都是蓄意诱发的，旨在降低严重的通货膨胀。
In other cases the culprit is human error. As central bankers freely admit, their control over the economy is imperfect. Policy works on a delay. Since not every shock can be anticipated, a bad blow may start a recession before a central bank can adequately respond. Or an inflation-averse central bank may discover, after it is too late to adjust course, that it raised interest rates once too often. What’s more, with interest rates in many economies near zero, central bankers find themselves increasingly reliant on unconventional tools, for which the margin of error is larger.
而另外几次衰退的元凶则是人为错误。央行行长们坦言他们对经济的调控并非完美。政策作用也会滞后。由于并非每一次经济冲击都可以预见，央行还来不及做出充分的反应，严重的冲击就可能引发衰退。或者，一个厌恶通胀的央行可能会发现先前加息太过频繁，想要扭转却为时已晚。此外，在很多国家利率已经趋近于零的情况下，央行行长们发现自己越来越依赖非常规工具，而这些工具出错的可能性会更大。
But there is a difference between misfortune and recklessness. Central banks that worry more about high inflation than low will tend to err on the hawkish side, and will find themselves steering into recession with some regularity. The Reserve Bank of Australia, which targets an inflation rate of between 2% and 3%, has given itself a floor to defend as well as a ceiling. That seems to help it from sinking into recession by mistake. The Fed, which has begun raising interest rates even as its preferred inflation measure remains below its target, has not absorbed this lesson—and Ms Yellen’s comments about the natural life of expansions should not be considered an alibi.
但不幸与蛮干还是有差别的。更担心高通胀率而非低通胀率的央行更有可能犯鹰派的错误，而且它们造成衰退的情况还有些规律可循。澳洲储备银行将通胀目标设定在2%到3%之间，在通胀的上下限两头作战，这似乎有助其避免误入衰退期。美联储并没有汲取这个经验，尽管其偏好的通胀指标低于目标，却已经着手加息。耶伦对经济扩张自然寿命的看法可不能拿来当借口啊。